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National supervisory authorities – partially under the impe-
tus of the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) – have been conducting stress testing 
exercises in their respective jurisdictions for almost a 
decade. However, the recent financial crisis has highlighted 
stress testing as an increasingly important prudential tool 
for assessing the banking system’s resilience to possible 
adverse economic developments and shocks concerning a 
variety of risks, such as credit, market and liquidity risks. To 
complement national analyses, in 2009 the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) – with the support 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) – launched an annual 
coordinated assessment of European banks using common 
scenarios and methodologies. Following the example of 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) con-
ducted in the US in 2009, the general methodology and 
both aggregate and bank-specific results of the 2010 CEBS 
EU-wide stress test were publicly disclosed, with the aim of 
increasing market confidence and reducing uncertainties 
surrounding major European banks’ fragilities. In addition, 
the regulation establishing the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) specifies that the EBA will initiate and coordinate 
regular, EU-wide stress tests to assess the resilience of 
financial institutions. Hence, EU-wide coordination and a 
high level of transparency are characteristics of the EBA’s 
2011 continuation of the EU-wide stress testing exercise.
Stress tests provide estimates of the impact of stressed 
macroeconomic scenarios on banks’ health. The macro-
economic stress is likely to have an impact on the compo-
nents of the profit and loss account (P&L), which through 
retained earnings impact the solvency position of banks’ 
balance sheets. Despite ongoing efforts to incorporate 
assessments of multiple bank risks in stress testing frame-
works, credit risk remains the main type of bank risk that 
is assessed in bank supervisory authorities’ stress testing 
exercises. As a consequence, most stress testing exercises 
concentrate on the impairments on banks’ loan portfolios 
(as opposed, for example, to exposures held for trading 
purposes). 
In considering the impact of a stressed macroeconomic 
scenario on banks’ loan impairments, the critical question 
that must be addressed by those conducting the stress 
test is how to measure the impact of the stressed macro-
economic variables on credit risk associated with the loan 
portfolio. Ideally, one would want to translate shocks to 
macroeconomic variables into an increase in expected 
losses on the portfolio. However, there are no unani-
mously accepted techniques for making such estimates. 
As a result, a number of modelling decisions must be 
made in the course of a stress test. These decisions thus 
obviously introduce model risk into the outcome of stress 
tests (i.e., into the estimated impact on banks). 
This article discusses a number of questions related to 
model risk in stress testing that have not been widely 
discussed but that nevertheless need to be addressed 
and understood by practitioners of stress tests. In par-
ticular, more needs to be understood about the relative 
implications of differing modelling choices in the stress 
testing process. These modelling choices relate to the fol-
lowing basic questions  : (i) How to link credit risk to the 
macroeconomic environment  ?, and (ii) Which variable(s) 106
to use for measuring credit risk in the portfolio  ? While 
these questions seem elementary, practitioners’ model-
ling choices and practical issues such as data availability 
have resulted in different approaches being taken, both 
in practice and in the literature on stress testing (see the 
table in the Appendix for an overview of and references 
to the different approaches). In our opinion, insufficient 
attention has been devoted to how the choices on the 
above two questions may affect the practical implementa-
tion and the outcome of stress tests.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.   
Section 1 presents the general modelling framework used 
in credit stress testing and discusses the impact of model-
ling choices on the implementation of stress testing as 
well as the risk of model inconsistency. In Section 2 we 
provide an overview of the credit risk variables that can be 
used for stress testing and the issue of robustness of stress 
testing outcomes across different credit risk variables.   
Section 3 offers some concluding remarks.
1.  The modelling framework
In this first Section we discuss the first of our two basic 
questions, namely how to link credit risk to the macroeco-
nomic environment . As a general background, we provide 
a brief overview of the different components of the credit 
stress testing process.  (1) A discussion of the credit risk part 
of the 2011 EBA stress testing exercise in this context is 
provided in Box 1. Next, we discuss how the modelling 
framework may affect the practical implementation of 
stress testing and warn against the potential for model 
inconsistency that may arise in this context.
1.1  The stress testing process
Credit stress tests assess the impact of a stressed macro-
economic scenario on the quality of banks’ credit expo-
sures. This approach essentially consists of three steps : (i) 
forecast values of macroeconomic variables under a given 
pre-specified (stressed) scenario over a given horizon, 
(ii) estimate the impact of the stressed macroeconomic 
variables on the banks’ credit risk parameters (typically 
probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD)) 
over a given horizon, and (iii) use these stressed credit risk 
parameters to evaluate the impact of the stress scenario 
on the banks’ P&L (and solvency). This typical stress test-
ing process is summarized in Chart 1.
The practical implementation of steps (i) and (ii) gener-
ally involves two different modelling stages. First, for 
forecasting the behaviour of macroeconomic variables 
(e.g., GDP growth and the long-term interest rate) under 
a pre-specified stress scenario over a given horizon, a 
macroeconometric model is typically used. In general, 
(1) Descriptions of the credit stress testing process and stress testing processes in 
general can be found in for example in Blaschke et al. (2001), Jones, Hilbers and 
Slack (2004), ˇ C   ihák (2007) and Foglia (2009).
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adverse shocks to one or more macroeconomic vari-
ables are entered into the model, and the equations in 
the model determine how these and other macro- 
economic variables behave over the stress testing hori-
zon as a consequence of the shocks. A second modelling 
component is required to estimate the impact of some 
stressed macroeconomic variables of interest  (1) on the 
banks’ credit risk parameters over the stress testing hori-
zon. This component, the credit risk model, essentially 
consists of one or more equations linking the banks’ 
credit risk parameters to the macroeconomic variables. 
The stressed macroeconomic variables obtained from the 
macroeconometric model are entered into this equation 
to obtain stressed values of the credit risk parameters. 
Finally, the stressed values of the credit risk parameters 
are applied to the banks’ P&L to obtain the estimated 
impact on their solvency position.
A distinction may be made between “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” stress tests. In their purest forms, the top-
down stress test is one in which authorities use data at 
their disposal to conduct all the steps of the stress test, 
including estimating the ultimate impact on P&L and 
solvency positions. In a pure bottom-up stress test, banks 
estimate the stressed credit risk variables and the ultimate 
impact on their P&L and solvency. Sometimes, a stress test 
is referred to as bottom-up if banks perform the final step, 
even though authorities may have supplied to the banks 
the stressed values of the macroeconomic variables and 
the stressed values of credit risk variables.
As macroeconometric models typically do not include a   
detailed financial sector and credit-risk related variables, 
the two modelling components outlined above are usu-
ally considered as two separate entries or modules in the 
stress testing framework. In this “modular approach”, 
the credit risk model is often referred to as the “satellite 
(or auxiliary) model”. When in contrast the link between 
credit risk and macroeconomic developments is integrated 
into or jointly estimated with the macroeconometric 
model, we refer to the stress testing framework as follow-
ing an “integrated approach” (as indicated by the blue 
dashed Box in Chart 1).
In the following subsections we discuss some of the impli-
cations of opting for a modular approach as compared 
to an integrated approach. First, we explain how the 
practical implementation of stress testing may either result 
in a point estimate of stressed credit risk or in an entire 
distribution of values for a stressed credit risk variable, in 
which case the focus can be on the tails of the distribution   
(i.e., the extreme observations in the distribution). The 
choice of either a modular or an integrated approach 
affects the degree to which relationships that are not cap-
tured by the equations of the models can be taken into 
account in the generation of the credit risk distribution. 
Second, we point at potential sources of model inconsis-
tency that may arise especially in the modular approach 
and threaten the internal consistency of the stress testing 
modelling framework.
(1) The macroeconomic variables of interest to which the credit risk parameters are 
linked are selected on the basis of economic theory and statistical significance.
Box 1 – The credit risk part of the 2011 EBA stress testing exercise
The 2011 EBA stress testing exercise embodies an internationally coordinated assessment, using common scenarios 
and methodologies, of European banks’ resilience to possible adverse economic developments and their ability to 
absorb possible shocks on credit, market and funding risks. In a centralized approach, coordination takes place 
between the EBA (with the support of the ECB) and national central banks/supervisory authorities, and between 
national central banks/supervisory authorities and the banks included in the stress testing exercise. The overall 
objective of the exercise is to provide policy information for assessing the resilience of the EU banking system.
The credit risk part of the 2011 EBA stress testing exercise is very much in line with the typical credit stress 
testing process described in the main text. In a first step, forecasts for the macroeconomic variables – reflecting a 
benchmark and an adverse scenario over a two-year horizon – are obtained from macroeconometric models by the 
European Commission and the ECB. In a second step, the credit risk parameters (PD and LGD) of different bank 
portfolios (financial institutions, sovereign, corporate, consumer credit and retail real estate) are evaluated under 
the two scenarios via a credit risk model linking these two parameters to a set of macroeconomic variables. Finally, 
the impact of the macroeconomic scenarios on the banks’ solvency positions is assessed.
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1.2  Practical implementation of scenario analysis
Once the necessary links between the macroeconomic 
environment and credit risk have been established via the 
modelling framework, the effect on credit risk of a given 
macroeconomic scenario can be estimated. As mentioned 
above, one or more shocks are typically entered into the 
macroeconometric model in order to generate a stressed 
path of some macroeconomic variables of interest. These 
stressed macroeconomic variables obtained from the 
macroeconometric model are then entered into the credit 
risk model to obtain stressed values of the credit risk 
parameters. Several approaches have been followed in 
implementing this in practice and in the credit stress test-
ing literature. One can distinguish between the “deter-
ministic approach” and the “stochastic (or probabilistic) 
approach”. The choice of approach determines whether 
one obtains a single estimate of the realisation of a 
stressed credit risk variable or a distribution of potential 
realisations of the variable.
We illustrate the difference between the two approaches 
on the basis of Chart 2. The Chart depicts the practi-
cal implementation of the stress testing process using a 
simplified macroeconometric model that determines the 
behaviour of two macroeconomic variables (GDP growth 
and the long-term interest rate) and a credit risk model 
that links the credit risk variable to the macroeconomic 
variables. To keep our example simple, suppose that the 
underlying model equations are the following :
  GDP = fGDP (GDP, i, εGDP) 
  i = fi (GDP, i, εi)
  C = fC (GDP, i, η)
where :
GDP is GDP growth, 
i is the long-term interest rate, 
C is the credit risk variable (e.g., bankruptcy rates, loan 
loss provisions or non-performing loans  (1)),
GDP and i represent lagged values of the macroeconomic 
variables GDP and i,
εGDP and εi represent error terms in the estimating 
regressions for GDP and i, respectively,
η represents the error term in the estimating regression 
for the credit risk variable C.
Thus, in this simple model, GDP growth is modelled by 
using its own lagged values, and the current value of the 
long-term interest rate as explanatory variables. Similarly, 
the long-term interest rate is modelled using its own 
lagged values and the current value of GDP growth as 
explanatory variables. Finally, in the credit risk model, the 
credit risk variable is modelled with the current values of 
GDP growth and the long-term interest rate as explanatory 
variables. The error terms in each equation reflect the vari-
ation in the value of the dependent variable not explained 
by the explanatory variables. The model, finally, entails 
making an assumption about the distribution of the error 
terms (for example, the normal distribution).
In the deterministic approach (as illustrated by the blue-
shaded boxes in Chart 2), a stressed realisation of each of 
the error terms εGDP and εi is drawn from their assumed 
distribution. The values of these realisations (εGDP
1  and εi
1) 
 are then used in the estimated equations of the macro-
econometric model to obtain forecast values of GDP 
growth (GDP1) and the long-term interest rate (i1). These 
values are then inserted in the estimated equation for the 
credit risk variable in order to obtain an estimate of the 
stressed value of the credit risk variable (C1). Thus, a single 
estimate of the stressed credit risk variable is obtained 
based on taking the fitted values of the credit risk equa-
tion  (2), where the macroeconomic variables are evaluated 
at their simulated stressed values and where the error 
term η is set equal to zero.
In principle, the 2011 EBA stress test is intended to be a bottom-up stress test, in that banks are allowed to 
perform the second and third steps themselves. That is, the baseline and adverse macroeconomic scenarios are 
communicated to the banks, who are then asked to link these scenarios to the credit risk parameters of the various 
portfolios of their banking book in order to simulate, via expected losses and impairments, the impact on their 
regulatory capital ratio. While the banks should have available the required models and input data to link credit 
risk parameters to macroeconomic movements, the EBA also provides baseline and stressed credit risk parameters 
obtained from a credit risk model that is estimated by the ECB, to which the banks can refer for assessing the 
impact on their capital position.
(1)  See Section 2 for a discussion of potential credit risk variables.
(2)  In practice, as the stress testing horizon contains multiple periods, one particular 
path of the stressed credit risk variable is based on one particular path of the 
stressed macroeconomic variables.109
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In contrast, the stochastic approach is characterised by 
repeating the above process many times, thereby gener-
ating a distribution of the credit risk variable, i.e., many 
different realisations rather than a single point estimate. 
This credit risk distribution can be obtained in several ways. 
One of the possible approaches is illustrated in Chart 2. 
Rather than taking one shock for εGDP and εi (i.e., the 
realisations εGDP
1  and εi
1) in the macroeconometric model 
to obtain single values of the stressed macroeconomic 
forecasts  GDP1 and i1, and consequently a single value 
for the stressed credit risk variable C1, one can repeat this 
process many (e.g., 10  000) times. As indicated by the 
blue dashed boxes and arrows, each set of macroeconomic 
shocks results in a predicted value of the stressed credit risk 
variable. The distribution implied by the 10 000 stressed 
credit risk variable forecasts (C1, ..., C10 000) may then be 
used to obtain a distribution of expected credit losses and 
allows focusing on the extreme observations within this 
distribution (the tail of the distribution). However, potential 
correlations between the error terms of the macroecono-
metric model (εGDP and εi) on the one hand and of the 
credit risk model (η) on the other, are ignored when the 
credit risk distribution is generated in this way.
An alternative approach to obtain a distribution rather 
than a point estimate of the credit risk variable is to insert 
into the credit risk model the stressed forecasts for GDP 
growth and the long-term interest rate (GDP1 and i1) 
based on one particular set of shocks εGDP
1  and εi
1 in the 
macroeconometric model, as is done in the deterministic 
approach, and then augment this step by taking many 
(e.g., 10 000) draws for the error term η of the credit risk 
model (rather than setting this term equal to zero, as was 
the case for the previous methodology). Given the macro-
economic stressed forecasts GDP1 and i1, each draw of 
η results in a stressed value for the credit risk variable. 
Again, potential correlations between the error terms of 
the macroeconometric equations (εGDP and εi) and the 
credit risk equation (η) are not accounted for when gener-
ating the credit risk distributions
A combination of both approaches described above is a 
straightforward extension  (1), in that multiple draws can be 
taken for the error terms εGDP and εi in the macroecono-
metric model, while at the same time taking many draws 
for the error term η of the credit risk model. Ideally, cor-
relations between the error terms of the macroeconometric 
equations and the credit risk equation (i.e., between εGDP 
and εi on the one hand and η on the other) are taken 
into account in this approach. This would allow for the 
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(1)  A distribution of the credit risk variable may also be obtained by applying 
bootstrapping methods. However, the purpose of this type of exercise is rather to 
evaluate the robustness and consistency of the underlying model specification.110
possibility that the macroeconomic shocks affect the credit 
risk variable not only through the observable variables of 
the modelled equations, but also through their correlation 
with the error term in the credit risk model. For example, 
when both the macroeconomic variables and the credit 
risk variable depend on some factors that are not taken 
into account in the models, the effect of these common 
factors may not be captured by the equations of the differ-
ent models, but rather be embedded in the relationships 
between the error terms. In our simple example with three 
variables (GDP growth, the long-term interest rate and 
the credit risk variable), such a common factor may be 
oil prices, for instance. Oil prices may affect not only GDP 
growth and the long-term interest rate, but also the debt 
servicing capacity of the banks’ credit counterparts (and 
therefore the credit risk variable). The effects of oil prices 
are not reflected in the equations of our simplified mod-
elling framework, but may be taken into account when 
allowing for correlations between the error terms of the 
macroeconometric model and the credit risk model. In prin-
ciple, an integrated approach is the only one which enables 
these correlations to be taken into account when generat-
ing values for the error terms of the macroeconomic equa-
tions and the credit risk equation. In a modular approach, 
the macroeconometric model and the credit risk model are 
treated as separate components or modules in the stress 
testing framework. The importance of taking account of 
these correlations in existing credit stress testing models is 
an issue which has hardly been investigated as yet.
1.3  Risk of model inconsistency
The risk of model inconsistency arises when separate 
model components in the stress testing framework, 
in casu the macroeconometric model and the credit risk 
model, contain the same or related variables, i.e., when 
equations of the same variables are estimated both in the 
macroeconometric model and in the credit risk model. In 
this case, discrepancies may arise between the forecasts 
implied by the credit risk model and those determined on 
the basis of the macroeconometric model. 
We illustrate this point by building an example on the 
basis of the simplified model discussed in the previous sub- 
Section. The left-hand panel of Table 1 repeats the 
equations of this model, which consists of two macro-
econometric equations (explaining GDP growth and the 
long-term interest rate) and one credit risk equation 
(explaining the credit risk variable using the macroeco-
nomic variables).
Suppose now that the practitioner conducting the stress 
test (more specifically, the person running the credit risk 
model), has to take the output of the macroeconometric   
model (i.e., the first two equations of our simplified 
model) as given. For example, the practitioner may be 
a member of a supervisory authority or of the financial 
stability department of a central bank, and the stress test 
will make use of a macroeconomic scenario generated by 
the macroeconomic forecasting unit of the central bank 
or by some external provider. 
Suppose in addition that the practitioner’s model for gener-
ating the stressed values of the credit risk variable includes 
extra equations, for example to capture feedback effects 
from the credit risk variable to GDP growth and the long-
term interest rate, as illustrated in the right-hand panel of 
Table 1.  (1) There is now a risk of model inconsistency, since 
the additional macroeconomic equations in the credit risk 
model may differ from those in the macroeconometric 
model, which could potentially result in predicted stressed 
values for the macroeconomic variables different from 
those implied by the macroeconometric model.
Another example of potential model inconsistency arises 
when the macroeconometric model includes an equation 
with a credit risk variable, perhaps measured at a very 
aggregate level (such as economy-wide default rates of 
firms), while the practitioner’s credit risk equation is esti-
mated at some lower level of aggregation (e.g., sectoral), 
and may also include different explanatory variables. The 
presence of two separate credit risk equations, one in the 
macroeconometric model and the other in the credit risk 
model, again gives rise to potential model inconsistency.  (2)
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(1)  Stress testing applications that separately model macroeconomic variables  
in addition to using a macroeconometric model for stressed predicted 
values include van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae (2006) and Åsberg and 
Shahnazarian (2008).
(2)  In Andersen et al. (2008), for example, firm and household default rates are mod-
elled in the macroeconometric model at an aggregate level, while in the credit 
risk model default risk is modelled at the borrower level.111
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The risk of model inconsistency is only likely to arise in 
the context of modular approaches  (1) since, in principle, 
integrated approaches are internally consistent in their 
construction. However, at least at present, the integrated 
modelling approach comes at the cost of reducing the 
model’s realism and intuitive interpretation. That is, models 
with integrated approaches tend to have financial sectors 
or credit relationships that are rather simplistic, therefore 
often lacking realism. In contrast, the modular approach 
allows adding more realism by introducing modular exten-
sions that capture several types of bank risk (such as 
market, liquidity and sovereign risk in addition to credit 
risk) and important features of risk generation and propa-
gation in the financial sector (such as interbank market 
contagion, asset fire sales and liquidity risk channels).  (2) 
Working with different modules may also facilitate robust-
ness checks on different parameters and assumptions 
within each module, potentially providing a range of stress 
testing outcomes corresponding to different underlying 
parameters and assumptions. The risk of model inconsis-
tency increases with the number of modules included in 
the model, however, especially as the different modules 
are often linked by reduced-form equations or rules of 
thumb.
Box 2 – Level of data aggregation
This Box considers the different levels of aggregation at which credit risk can be linked to the macroeconomic 
environment.  (1) The different levels of data aggregation are illustrated in the Chart below, which considers the 
corporate exposures of a set of J banks to firms in N industrial sectors in a particular jurisdiction (country).  (2) In our 
discussion, we focus on four possible levels of aggregation : the borrower (firm) level, the bank level, the sectoral 
level and the aggregate level.
The most granular approach in linking credit risk parameters to macroeconomic developments can be obtained 
using borrower-level data (e.g., estimating the borrower’s probability of default). In this approach, the credit risk 
variable for each separate firm (a, b, c, etc.) in the Chart is linked to macroeconomic variables. By allowing the 
sensitivity of credit risk variables to macroeconomic variables to differ across firms, differences in the potential 
reactions of firms to adverse macroeconomic shocks may be revealed. This would also allow a more detailed 
picture to be obtained of the effect of macroeconomic stress on a bank’s portfolio. However, in order to fully 
exploit the informational advantage obtained by using borrower-level data, the person conducting the stress test 
should have knowledge of (or make assumptions about) the exact composition of the banks’ portfolios. This may 
be problematic for top-down stress tests. Even in a bottom-up stress test the borrower-level approach may not be 






















(1)  The risk of internal inconsistencies, both conceptual and empirical, arising from 
the modular structure of stress testing models has also been raised by Borio and 
Drehmann (2009), for example.
(2)  Examples of such models include Boss et al. (2006), Aikman et al. (2009), 
Alessandri et al. (2009) and Gauthier et al. (2010).
(1)  This need not coincide with the level of aggregation – e.g., portfolio, bank or system-wide level – at which the resilience assessment in terms of losses or capital 
adequacy is performed.
(2)  As most of the papers in the credit stress testing literature focus on corporate credit risk, the illustration concentrates on firms and industrial sectors. However, the 
example may be generalised to other types of borrowers and portfolios.112
2.  The choice of the credit risk variable
In the previous Section, we deliberately remained general 
in our discussion of credit risk by referring to credit risk 
parameters or credit risk variables. In this section, we dis-
cuss the specific variables that could be used to measure 
credit risk. In general, three concepts play a crucial role in 
credit risk stress testing  : the probability of default (PD), 
the loss given default (LGD) and the exposure at default 
(EAD). This terminology, which reflects the Basel II frame-
work, allows computing, on a portfolio basis, expected 
loss as EL = PD * LGD * EAD. The expected loss estimate 
is based on a best estimate of the deterioration in the 
creditworthiness of the credit portfolio or of default (i.e., 
an increase in PD and / or LGD).  (1) 
In order to implement a stress test, the credit risk components 
of expected losses have to be mapped into observable vari-
ables. The basic question that arises in this context is which 
variable(s) to use for measuring credit risk in the portfolio. In 
the remainder of this Section we discuss the different types 
of credit risk variables used in practice and raise the issue of 
robustness of stress testing outcomes to the choice of dif-
ferent credit risk variables. This choice is often determined 
by practical considerations, such as data availability at the 
desired level of aggregation (see Box 2 for an overview of 
the different levels of aggregation at which credit risk can 
be linked to the macroeconomic environment).
2.1   Credit risk variables used in practice
Several variables – some of which are purely aimed 
at capturing PDs, while others may also include LGD 
components  (2) – have been used in credit stress testing 
feasible, in that evaluating the sensitivity of the credit risk of every individual borrower to macroeconomic stress 
may require substantial resources.
When data on the credit risk of individual borrowers and /or information on the banks’ portfolio composition are 
not available, an alternative may be to use credit risk information aggregated at the level of the different banks 
(bank-level data, such as non-performing loans or impairments), as indicated by the green dashed boxes in the 
Chart. While linking credit risk to the macroeconomic environment at this level of aggregation does not allow for 
differentiating between the effects of macroeconomic stress on the different individual firms or the different loan 
portfolios of the bank, it does allow for distinguishing the effects of macroeconomic stress across banks.
Alternatively, instead of vertical aggregation of the firm-level credit risk data in the Chart, the aggregation may also 
take place in a horizontal direction, to obtain sectoral credit risk data (see the blue dashed boxes in the Chart). The 
sectoral approach allows for a heterogeneous treatment of banks in terms of sensitivity to macroeconomic stress, 
provided that information is available on different banks’ exposures to different sectors. If this is the case, it may 
also be possible to obtain sectoral credit risk data at the bank level (bank-sector observations), i.e., horizontally 
aggregating firms for each bank separately as in the purple dashed boxes in the Chart.
The final level of aggregation is economy-wide, as indicated by the red dashed box in the Chart. The advantage 
of such an aggregate approach is that economy-wide data are generally more readily available than more granular 
data. Modelling the aggregate behaviour of borrowers is also potentially less complex than the individual borrower 
approach. Nevertheless, aggregate data potentially ignore significant variations across firms or banks that would 
be captured in a more granular approach. 
In summary, an important question relating to data aggregation is whether stress testing outcomes are robust 
across different levels of aggregation.  (1)
(1)  Düllmann and Kick (2010) compare the results of a credit stress test based on borrower-specific PDs to those obtained for a sectoral average of the PDs. They find a 
substantial information gain in using borrower-specific PDs instead of sector-level PD, i.e., there is a higher dispersion across banks in the relative increase in expected 
losses under the stress scenario in the case of using borrower-specific PDs compared to sector-level PDs.
(1)  EAD is regularly reported by banks and is typically treated as fixed over the stress 
testing horizon.
(2)  Whereas in stress testing applications, the stressed values of PD are usually obtained 
from an estimated equation that explains PD using macroeconomic variables as 
explanatory variables, the stressed value of LGD is often based on an assumption 
(e.g., imposing an ad-hoc value for the LGD over the stress testing horizon).113
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applications. We distinguish between variables based on 
bank accounting data, default data and model-based 
measures, respectively. The main characteristics of these 
variables are also summarized in Table 2.
2.1.1  Bank accounting data
A bank accounting measure that may serve as a proxy for 
default rates is the ratio of (new) non-performing loans to 
a given measure of total loans (NPL ratio).  (1) Conceptually, 
the NPL ratio may be a good proxy for PD, as non-
performing loans are those loans for which it is likely 
that a contractual payment will not be made and which 
are therefore technically in default. However, there is no 
single definition of non-performing loans  ; while non-
performing loans are usually determined by a criterion 
such as x days overdue, the value of x may differ across 
banks (typically x equals 60 or 90). Therefore, unless some 
harmonisation has been imposed by regulatory authorities 
(as in Belgium) the NPL ratio may not be entirely compara-
ble across different banks.
Following an increase in expected credit loss (due to 
a rise in PD or LGD), banks may create new provisions 
and record them as impairments on the expense side of 
their P&L with an ultimate impact on their Tier 1 capital 
through lower retained earnings. Therefore, another 
natural candidate for capturing credit risk is the ratio of 
(new)  loan loss provisions (or impairments) to a given 
measure of the stock of total loans (LLP ratio, also referred 














Ratio of NPLs to a measure of total loans ; 
NPLs are loans for which principal or 
interest payments are more than x days in 
arrears, where x typically equals 60 or 90
PD Potential absence of harmonized definition 
for NPLs across banks ; affected by 
write-offs
       
Loan loss provision  
(LLP) ratio
Ratio of LLPs to a measure of total 
loans; new provisions may be created 
and recorded as impairments, following 
an increase in expected losses on a loan 
portfolio (potentially before arrears in 
payments have occurred)
PD ; LGD Dependent on accounting rules and bank’s 
discretion / provisioning policy ; affected by 
write-offs and reversals
 
  default data
 
Default rate Ratio of number of borrowers in default 
to total number of borrowers; under 
the Basel II framework, an obligor is 
considered to be in default when either 
the bank considers that the borrower is 
unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full 
or when any material credit obligation to 
the bank is more than 90 days overdue
PD Not publicly available
       
Bankruptcy rate Ratio of the number of firms filing for 
bankruptcy to total number of firms
PD Understates default ;  
generally applies only to firms
 




Probability (or expectation) of default  
over a future one-year horizon extracted  
from market information  
(e.g., stock prices, CDS spreads)
PD Only available for publicly listed firms ; 
market prices are affected by non-credit 
risk related factors
       
Banks' internally  
estimated PDs
Probability (or expectation) of default  
over a future one-year horizon based  
on bank’s internal model
PD Not publicly available ; limited history ;  
bank model dependent ;  
potentially a “through-the-cycle” measure
 
(1)  This is suggested for example by Blaschke et al. (2001).114
to as the credit cost ratio). Interestingly, the LLP ratio is 
not a pure measure of PD ; it also entails an LGD compo-
nent.  (1) However, accounting rules on provisioning may 
differ across jurisdictions. In addition, changes in the LLP 
ratio do not necessarily reflect only credit risk, but may 
also depend on banks’ provisioning policies, which may 
involve, for example, income smoothing for fiscal rea-
sons.  (2) Thus, within the existing regulations, banks often 
have some discretion in recording new impairments.
This potential lack of comparability of non-performing 
loans and loan loss provisions across banks implies that it 
may be useful to complement bank accounting measures 
of credit risk with more direct or strictly defined measures 
of borrower default to assess their robustness.
2.1.2  Default data
A direct measure of PD may be found in banks’ observed 
default data ; these data may be available at borrower level 
(as a 0/1 indicator of default), or at more aggregate levels 
expressed as a default rate. In contrast to non-performing 
loans, the definition of default is harmonised under the 
Basel II framework, according to which an obligor is con-
sidered to be in default when either the bank considers 
that the borrower is unlikely to pay its credit obligations 
in full or when he is more than 90 days overdue on any 
material credit obligation to the bank. Banks’ default data 
are sometimes also centralized in (central banks’) credit 
registers, to which banks typically have to report loan-level 
information for each loan contract whose size exceeds a 
given (relatively low) threshold. These data sources there-
fore provide wide coverage of the banks’ loan portfolios. 
In contrast to bank accounting data, however, these data 
are usually not publicly available. 
As an alternative to default information, which is not 
always available in credit registers, information on bank-
ruptcy filings may be used. While bankruptcy rates are 
likely to understate default – as default is not always 
followed by bankruptcy – they are nevertheless relatively 
frequently used as a credit risk measure in stress testing 
because of the lack of publicly available data on default. 
In contrast to default data, information on bankruptcy 
filings is usually publicly available. However, bankruptcy 
data usually only apply to firms  ; therefore, they cannot 
provide an estimate of default rates for loans to house-
holds, for example.
2.1.3  Model-based measures
A final category of measures used as credit risk vari-
ables in stress testing consists of model-based measures. 
Rather than directly conducting the analysis on the basis 
of observed credit risk variables, these studies typically 
employ a combination of market information, such as 
stock returns or CDS spreads, and a (structural) portfolio 
credit risk model to generate estimates of banks’ credit 
losses under adverse scenarios.
When market information is used to derive the credit risk 
variable, two possible approaches can be followed to link 
the credit risk variable to the macroeconomic variables. 
One approach is to first estimate the credit risk compo-
nent of the market price, using macroeconomic variables 
as explanatory variables, and then to evaluate the credit 
risk component using stressed values of the macroeco-
nomic variables. An alternative approach is to first esti-
mate the relationship between the market data and the 
macroeconomic variables, to evaluate the market prices at 
stressed values of the macroeconomic variables, and then 
to extract the credit risk variable from the stressed market 
price data. An interesting but unanswered question is 
how big the difference is between the stressed values of 
the credit risk variables, and hence, the outcomes of the 
stress test, from these two approaches.
The advantage of the market-based indicators is that 
they can be constructed on the basis of borrower-level 
data that are publicly available. However, the coverage 
of banks’ loan portfolios that can be obtained in this 
approach may be limited, since market data are only 
available for publicly listed firms and are typically not 
available for SMEs and households, which may represent 
a large fraction of the banks’ loan portfolios. Finally, 
movements in market prices are not necessarily related to 
credit risk  ; market price changes are also likely to reflect 
other factors that may be unrelated to credit risk, such as 
market liquidity, investors’ risk aversion or general market 
sentiment.  (3)
As an alternative to market-based credit risk information, 
one may consider using banks’ model-based internally 
estimated PDs, which are assigned to each loan in a port-
folio. In the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach of the 
Basel framework, these estimated default probabilities are 
used for computing risk-weighted assets in order to deter-
mine the bank’s regulatory capital requirement. As banks’ 
internally estimated PDs are usually not publicly available 
and have a short history, these data are rarely used in 
stress testing exercises. In addition, some authorities have 
found that different banks sometimes assign quite dif-
ferent PDs to the same firms. Another disadvantage of 
(1)  In fact, van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae (2006) exploit this feature of the 
LLP ratio to separately identify the behaviour of LGD in addition to that of PD by 
combining data on the LLP ratio with bankruptcy rate data.
(2)  See e.g., Foglia (2009).
(3)  This is not only true for stock prices, which in general may be expected to 
depend on all factors that affect the firm’s future profitability, but also for credit 
default swaps (see e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Annaert et al. (2010) and 
Bongaerts et al. (2011)).115
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banks’ internally estimated default probabilities, besides 
their limited availability, is the fact that these PDs are often 
“through-the-cycle”, meaning that the PD for a borrower 
may be estimated either as an average value over an 
entire cycle or as the probability of default in a downturn. 
2.2  Robustness of stress testing outcomes across 
different credit risk variables
As no ideal measure of credit risk seems to exist, practi-
tioners often have to choose among different potential 
credit risk variables, and the ultimate choice may to a large 
extent be driven by practical considerations such as data 
availability. It is therefore important to assess the robust-
ness of stress testing results to the choice of the credit 
risk variable. In this sub-Section we discuss some of the 
factors that may contribute to differences in stress test- 
ing outcomes when using different credit risk variables. 
In particular, we focus on the issue of using stocks versus 
flows and on the speed at which the different credit risk 
variables incorporate credit risk information. In Box 3 we 
provide an illustration of the issue of robustness of stress 
testing results across different credit risk variables using 
Belgian data.
2.2.1  Stocks versus flows
When using bank accounting information (non-perform-
ing loans, loan loss provisions) to construct a credit risk 
variable, it has been argued that write-offs (or charge-
offs) and reversals (or recoveries) may blur the picture of 
developments in credit risk obtained from the account- 
ing data.  (1) For example, large write-offs may result in a 
decrease in the stock of LLPs (and NPLs), even when the 
flow of new provisions (and NPLs) has increased. Some 
practitioners have therefore suggested using the flow 
of new NPLs or LLPs rather than the stock of existing 
NPLs or LLPs, or adjusting the stocks for write-offs.  (2) 
In addition, the composition of the loan portfolio may 
change over time, as existing loan contracts end and 
new contracts enter the banking book. As NPLs and 
LLPs are typically expressed relative to some measure of 
total loans (the NPL ratio and the LLP ratio), strong loan 
growth may result in a decrease in the LLP (and NPL) 
ratio, even when the flow of new provisions (and NPLs) 
may have increased. Similar comments may also apply to 
alternative credit risk variables, such as default rates and 
bankruptcy rates.
In summary, the use of different variants of particular 
credit risk variables may introduce sources of divergence 
in stress testing outcomes, as for example an LLP ratio 
constructed from the stock of LLPs may react differently 
to the macroeconomic variables than an LLP ratio based 
on the flow of new provisions. 
2.2.2  Speed of credit risk information incorporation
Another feature of the data that may affect the robust-
ness of stress testing outcomes to the choice of credit 
risk variable is the speed at which credit information is 
reflected in the credit risk variable. One issue that has 
received some attention in stress testing is the backward 
or forward-looking nature of the data. On the one hand, 
event-based data, such as non-performing loans, and 
default and bankruptcy data, are typically backward-
looking, in that they include information only on past 
events. Moreover, the speed at which the evolution of 
credit risk is reflected in these event-based variables 
depends on the underlying definitions of the event, 
which may differ across the different variables (e.g., the 
number of days overdue for non-performing loans and 
default data, the time between actual distress and the 
bankruptcy filing in the case of bankruptcy rates). Credit 
risk variables based on loan loss provisions may, in princi-
ple, also be considered to be backward-looking, but the 
extent to which this is the case may depend on the bank’s 
provisioning policy.
Model-based credit risk variables, such as those based on 
market information or banks’ internally estimated PDs, are 
said to be forward-looking, or ex ante, measures of credit 
risk. Model-based PDs (if based on the Basel II concept) 
typically reflect the probability (or expectation) of default 
over a future one-year horizon. Important in this respect is 
also the potential through-the-cycle nature of the model-
based credit risk variables.  (3) To the extent that they are 
indeed through-the-cycle, as opposed to “point-in-time”, 
this may hamper the finding of any statistically significant 
relationship of the credit risk variable with macroeco-
nomic movements.  (4) 
These timing features of the various credit risk variables 
may imply different (timing in the) reactions of specific 
credit risk variables to stressed macroeconomic variables 
and hence, potentially different stress testing outcomes.
(1)  Write-offs imply the removal of a loan from the balance sheet when the loan is 
considered completely unrecoverable. Reversals occur on impairments that have 
previously been recognised in the accounts and follow events that suggest an 
increase in the recoverable amount of the asset (e.g., an improvement of the bor-
rower’s ability to pay). Reversals are recognised as a credit to the P&L.
(2)  See e.g., Pain (2003) and Jakubík and Schmieder (2008).
(3)  See Section 2.1.3.
(4)  Sorge and Virolainen (2006) observe that while accounting measures of risk are 
very sensitive to the business cycle, market-based indicators exhibit substantial 
variability both across firms and over time, but appear to be less responsive to 
macroeconomic or systematic risk factors.116
Box 3 – Illustration of robustness issue using data for Belgian banks
This Box assesses the impact of the choice of the credit risk variable on the outcome of a credit stress testing 
exercise. We consider the impact of a hypothetical macroeconomic scenario on three potential credit risk measures 
for the Belgian banking sector : the non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio), the flow of new impairments over total 
loans (LLP ratio), and the bankruptcy rate.  (1)
The results below are based on highly simplified modelling assumptions, purely to illustrate the potential impact 
of the choice of the credit risk variable. These results should not be interpreted as the outcome of a real credit 
stress testing exercise for the Belgian banking sector. In particular, we relate quarterly observations of the credit risk 
variables to their own lagged values and to current and lagged values of the yearly GDP growth rate of Belgium 
and the 10-year yield of Belgian government bonds. To facilitate comparison of the variables and results, we 
estimate the same specification for each of the three credit risk variables.  (2) For estimation of each of the models, 
we consider a common sample for the three data series spanning the time period 1995Q1-2009Q4. 
After estimation of the model, we assume that for the period 2010Q1-2011Q4 history repeats itself and that GDP 
growth rates and long-term interest rates follow the same path as they did over the crisis period 2008Q1-2009Q4. 
This historical scenario is selected on an ad-hoc basis and is aimed only at providing an illustration of the (potential 
lack of) robustness of stress testing outcomes for different credit risk variables. The left-hand panel of the Chart 





































































































GDP growth projection 2010-2011
Long-term interest rate 
projection 2010-2011
Bankruptcy rate projection 2010-2011
LLP ratio projection 2010-2011
NPL ratio projection 2010-2011
(left-hand scale)
(right-hand scale)
(1)  The NPL and LLP ratios were obtained from data in the supervisory reporting scheme. Bankrupcty rates were obtained from data on bankruptcy filings and the NBB’s 
central corporate credit register.
(2)  The credit risk variables were seasonally adjusted, logit transformed and first-differenced before estimating the credit risk equation, in which four lags were included 
for each explanatory variable. 
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whereas the right-hand panel presents the observed (normalised) credit risk variables and the calculated impact of 
the historical macroeconomic scenario for the three credit risk variables (projection 2010-2011)  (1).
From the right-hand panel, we observe that the reactions of the three credit risk variables to the macroeconomic 
stress scenario seem to differ somewhat. While both the bankruptcy rate and the NPL ratio increase from the 
first quarter onward, the LLP ratio drops during the first quarter of the stress horizon and then increases again. 
Moreover, while bankruptcy rates and the LLP ratio attain their maximum value in the third quarter of 2011, the NPL 
ratio reaches its maximum value earlier, in the fourth quarter of 2010. We also see that bankruptcy rates seem to 
react somewhat more strongly to the imposed stress scenario. More precisely, the maximal change over the period 
2010Q1-2011Q4 is 18.9 % and 36.1 %, respectively for impairments and for bankruptcy rates, and 10.5 % for NPL. 
One of the potential reasons for these differences in the patterns of stressed values for the credit risk variables may 
be found in variations in the timing with which variables reflects changes in credit risk. Another explanation may 
be the different coverage of the variables  : whereas bankruptcy rates only include exposures to Belgian firms, the 
LLP and NPL ratio include exposures to both firms and households, as well as foreign exposures of Belgian banks.
Finally, we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation to illustrate the potential implications of the above 
differences for stressed values in terms of P&L and bank capital. Assuming that LGD is fixed at a value of 0.45, we 
can interpret the reported stressed increases in the credit risk variables as proxies for stressed increases in PD. Given 
that EL=PD*LGD*EAD and that the major Belgian banks have an average EAD to the corporate and retail sector of 
€ 152bn, our hypothetical macroeconomic stress scenario would increase EL by € 165mln based on the NPL ratio, 
€ 402mln based on bankruptcy rates and € 31mln based on the LLP ratio. These increases in EL amount to about 
1.02 %, 2.50% and 0.19 %, respectively, of average Tier 1 capital held by the major Belgian banks.
In summary, the choice of the credit risk variable may matter for the outcome of a stress test. The extent to which 
this choice results in large potential differences in terms of P&L and balance sheet effects should be investigated 
on a case-by-case basis.
3.  Concluding remarks
In this article we have discussed a number of questions 
related to model risk in credit stress testing that have not 
been widely discussed but that nevertheless need to be 
addressed and understood by practitioners of stress tests. 
We have focused on the relative implications of differing 
modelling choices in the stress testing process and, in 
particular, on the questions of how to link credit risk to 
the macroeconomic environment and which variables to 
use for measuring credit risk in the portfolio.
Regarding the link between the macroeconomic environ-
ment and credit risk, we distinguish between integrated 
and modular approaches. An integrated approach allows 
consistent treatment of all relationships between macro-
economic variables and credit risk variables, but at the 
cost of reducing the model’s realism and intuitive interpre-
tation. In contrast, the modular approach allows adding 
more realism and may facilitate robustness checks on dif-
ferent parameters and assumptions within each module, 
potentially providing a range of stress testing outcomes 
corresponding to different underlying parameters and 
assumptions. However, modular approaches embody the 
risk of model inconsistency.
With respect to the choice of credit risk variables, we 
argue that, since the ultimate choice may to a large extent 
be driven by practical considerations such as data avail-
ability, it is important to assess the robustness of stress 
testing results to the choice of the credit risk variable. In 
this context, we identify potential factors that may con-
tribute to variations in stress testing outcomes when using 
different credit risk variables. In addition to the alternative 
definitions of various proxies for default, we focus on the 
question of using stock versus flow variables and on the 
issue of the varying speeds at which the different credit 
risk variables incorporate credit risk information.
(1)  A deterministic approach is used to obtain the stressed values of the credit risk variables. To facilitate comparison, the credit risk variables are normalised such that 
their value in 2009Q4 equals 100.118
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Market-based  
measures
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